The Minton Papers #NZ, RTC chasing $3.0 Million from Minton re Grady Ward

The Minton Papers #NZ
RTC chasing $3.0 Million from Minton re Grady Ward

What follows is an uncorrected OCR of a reply dated 4-11-01 to a motion by RTC to depose me in order to collect the $3 million stipulated judgement on Grady Ward by virtue of bogus claim of alter-ego and/or enterprise liability. I will try to post the RTC motion dated March 16, 2001 asap.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

In Re An Action Pending in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, San Jose Division

RELIGIOUS TECHNOLOGY CENTER,	        )
 a California non-profit corporation,	)
			                )  Mass. Misc. Docket No: 99?MC?10211
	Plaintiff,	                )
			                )  No. C?96?20207 RMW EAI
VS.		                        )  Northern District of California
                                        )
GRADY WARD, individual,	                )
	Defendant.	                )

Robert S. Minton hereby submits this consolidated memorandum in reply to Religious Technology Center's (RTC) Opposition to Motion for Protective Order and in opposition to RTC's Cross?Motion for an Order of Contempt.'

I. INTRODUCTION

In opposing Mr. Minton's motion for a protective order, RTC does not squarely address the substance of the motion but instead focuses its efforts on attacking Mr. Minton and spinning its fictional theory of a Minton?led "conspiracy" against the Church of Scientology ("COS"). As the Court can see from RTC's papers, there is substantial history between COS and Mr. Minton. The proper place to address RTC's conspiracy theories and their relevance to the central issue ?the execution of the judgment against Grady Ward ? is in the court in which the judgment was entered, the Northern District of California ("the Northern District"). The Northern District is the court that ruled on the scope of discovery on the judgment; it is the court that decided not to permit RTC to execute on the judgment; and it is the court that has explicitly retained jurisdiction concerning execution of the judgment. If RTC believes its conspiracy theory justifies discovery against Mr. Minton, it should take it up with the Northern District. Its unwillingness to do so speaks volumes on the impropriety of the discovery.

II. MR. MINTON'S MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER IS APPROPRIATE AND TIMELY, AND SHOULD BE GRANTED

Because RTC has not offered a sufficient reason to warrant further discovery of Mr. Minton under Rule 69, Mr. Minton's motion for a protective order should be granted.

A. Because the Northern District of California has specifically disallowed RTC's motion for leave to execute on the judgment against Ward, there is no judgment that may be aided in execution by discovery pursuant to Rule 69. Mr. Minton's motion for a protective order is straightforward, simple, and timely. Mr. Minton asks only that this Court enter a protective order prohibiting RTC from seeking further discovery of him unless and until it is authorized to execute the judgment.

At the heart of Mr. Minton's motion is the fact that the Northern District has refused to permit RTC to execute on the judgment entered against Ward. The Court entered that order in the period between the filing of Mr. Minton's Motion for a Protective Order and the submission of this Reply Memorandum. As of March 2, 2001, when Mr. Minton filed his motion for a protective order, RTC's motion for leave to execute the $3 million stipulated judgment was pending. On March 22, 2001, the Honorable Jeremy Fogel of the Northern District of California denied RTC's motion, making it clear that RTC is not entitled to execute on the judgment.

(1) RTC's Consolidated Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion for Protective Order dated March 28, 2001 is cited to herein as "RTC's Consolidated Memorandum" or "RTC Consol. Mem."

Supplemental Affidavit of Linda M. Ricci, dated April 11, 2001 (hereinafter "Suppl. Ricci Aff."), Exh. N.

RTC asserts that there is no relationship between execution of the judgment and Rule 69 discovery. See RTC Consol. Mem. at 2, 3. This position borders on frivolous. The purpose of Rule 69 is to permit discovery "in aid of the judgment or execution." Fed. R. Civ. P. 69. Where, as here, execution of the judgment specifically has been disallowed, there is no basis upon which to conduct discovery in aid of such execution. Notably, RTC has failed to cite even a single case for the proposition that it may conduct Rule 69 discovery "in aid of the judgment or execution" notwithstanding that the only judgment that has been entered in this matter is one on which RTC cannot execute. See Fish Market Nominee Corp. v. PelofskX, 72 F.3d 4, 5 (1st Cir. 1995) (noting that discovery to determine location of judgment debtor's property available to satisfy judgment is stayed where proceedings to enforce judgment have been stayed).

As demonstrated above, there is no longer any question as to whether RTC is entitled immediately to execute on the judgment; the Northern District has ruled that it cannot do so. To the extent that RTC argues that it wishes to proceed pursuant to Rule 69 in order to identify assets for future execution against Ward, the best that can be said about that argument is that it is premature. Beyond that, the Northern District might well view it as contemptuous.

B. Any attempt?by RTC to proceed on the basis of alter ego or enterprise liability is premature and inappropriate.

When they received notice of the Northern District's order denying execution (not from RTC's counsel), Mr. Minton's counsel called RTC's counsel and asked her to withdraw RTC's Motion to Compel and its request to depose Mr. Minton. Suppl. Ricci Aff., 9[9[ 3?4 & Exhs. K?M. Although she acknowledged that RTC was not entitled to execute the judgment against Ward, she stated that RTC intends to execute the judgment against others "beyond Ward," including

Mr. Minton, who RTC alleges are responsible for the judgment on a theory of alter ego or enterprise liability. Id. RTC has never presented this theory of liability to the Northern District, and Mr. Minton, as a non?party to the litigation, has never had the opportunity to address the court that entered the judgment as to why he should not be responsible for it. When Mr. Minton's counsel asked whether RTC intends to seek approval of the Northern District before proceeding on an alter ego or enterprise liability theory, RTC's counsel stated that it did not. Suppl. Ricci Aff., Exh. M.

1. The Northern District of California is the appropriate court to address RTC's alternative theory of liability.

As an initial matter, the Northern District of California is the appropriate forum in which to advance RTC's newly?minted theory and to address whether discovery may be taken on it. In an Order Regarding Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions and Renewed Motion to Compel dated May 23, 2000, the Northern District ruled that it retained jurisdiction over the execution of the judgment and that, "[a]ccordingly, if RTC seeks execution, it must do so before this Court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a)." Affidavit of Linda M. Ricci, dated March 2, 2001 (hereinafter "Ricci Aff."), Exh. D, at 3?4. The last time around, RTC heeded that order and asked the Northern District for leave to execute on the judgment. Its motion was denied. If it wishes to execute in a different fashion, RTC must go back to the Northern District. RTC's obvious concern that the Northern District will turn it down again is no justification for circumventing that court's retention of jurisdiction.

2. There are ample reasons, all of which should be addressed by the Northern District of California, why RTC cannot pursue Mr. Minton on an alternate theory of liability.

Even if this Court were to wade into the issue of an alternate theory of liability, there are ample reasons for rejecting RTC's proposed discovery of Mr. Minton. First, it is wholly improper for RTC to use discovery against a non?party to search for a cause of action against him. Second, RTC's theory is fatally flawed and cannot serve as a basis for collection of the judgment from Mr. Minton. For these reasons, RTC cannot pursue discovery of Mr. Minton on an alternate theory of liability.

At the outset, RTC should not be permitted to take discovery of Mr. Minton for the purpose of attempting to "discover" a right of action against Mr. Minton. Discovery requests against non?parties designed for use in different proceedings or for purposes of discovering a reason to sue the non?party are improper. Oppenheimer Fund v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 352?53 (1978) ("[W]hen the purpose of a discovery request is to gather information for use in proceedings other than the pending suit, discovery is properly denied."); Blount Int'1 v. Schuylkill Energy Resources Inc., 124 F.R.D. 523, 527 (D. Mass. 1989) (plaintiff should not be permitted to take discovery of non?party for purpose of discovering cause of action against it in another suit).

In addition, RTC's proposed discovery in the area of alter ego liability should be denied because RTC's theory is flawed. Under California law, a plaintiff must demonstrate such "unity of interest" between the defendant and the alter ego that there is no unfairness in collapsing their separate personalities and treating the underlying acts of the defendant as those of the alter ego. See NEC Elecs. Inc. v. Hurt, 256 Cal. Rptr. 441, 443 (Ct. App. 1989) (setting forth requirements for alter ego liability). In the present case, there can be no basis for a finding of the required "unity of interest," because Mr. Minton was not involved in any way with the underlying conduct that constituted Ward's copyright violation. Suppl. Ricci Aff., Exh. Q?A (Affidavit of

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a) governs the execution of judgments awarded by federal courts. In the absence of controlling federal authority, Rule 69(a) requires the trial court to follow "practices and procedures?of the state in which the district court is held." Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a). Thus, in the present matter, the Court must look to California law concerning matters bearing on execution of the judgment.

Robert S. Minton dated Jan. 13, 19983), 9[ 7. Indeed, the first time Mr. Minton ever communicated with Ward was after RTC's copyright action was filed against Ward. Id. Thus, there are no facts upon which it may be found that Mr. Minton dominated or controlled the infringing conduct of Ward such that he was Ward's alter ego. See, e.g., Caribe Trailer Sys., Inc. v. Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Authority, 475 F. Supp. 711 (D.D.C. 1979) ("The essential element required before a court can find that one corporate entity was transacting business through an alter ego is control over the conduct that allegedly violated the [] laws."); cf. Rex Chainbelt, Inc. v. General Kinematics Com., 363 F.2d 336, 344 (7th Cir. 1966) (finding alter ego liability where defendant "actively induced infringement by participating in the infringing activities of [the] corporate defendant"). In sum, because Mr. Minton did not participate in the infringing conduct, RTC has no valid basis upon which to seek discovery into the area of alter ego liability. C. Mr. Minton's motion for a protective order is timely and filed in good faith. RTC's counsel flagrantly has misrepresented the state of discovery by arguing that Mr. Minton's motion is untimely and that he did not participate in the "meet and confer" process in good faith. On January 10, 2001, counsel for RTC initiated the meet and confer process with respect to RTC's request to depose Mr. Minton for the third time in this matter. Declaration of Helena K. Kobrin dated March 16, 2001 (hereinafter "Kobrin Decl."), Exh. 42. As reflected by the correspondence between counsel for RTC and for Mr. Minton, Mr. Minton agreed to appear for a third day of deposition, proposed alternate dates for his deposition, and agreed to produce additional documents. Suppl. Ricci Aff., 9[ 2; Kobrin Decl., Exhs. 44?46. Moreover, the parties substantially narrowed the issues concerning the scope of the questioning during the third day.

Mr. Minton's Affidavit dated January 13, 1998 is updated to a large extent in his Affidavit dated December 7, 2000. In addition, since making his January 13, 1998 Affidavit, Mr. Minton has given additional monies to Ward.

Id. This substantive discussion continued by the exchange of correspondence through February 14, 2001. Id.

At no time during these negotiations between counsel did RTC's counsel disclose the pendency of RTC's September 30, 2000 motion for leave to execute on the judgment before the Northern District. Suppl. Ricci Aff., 9[ 2. Instead, Mr. Minton's counsel implicitly was led to assume that RTC had the authority to conduct the deposition. For that reason, Mr. Minton appeared for his deposition on November 2, 2000 even though RTC arguably had no authority to take the deposition. Mr. Minton learned of the Northern District's action on RTC's motion only from a third party on March 26, 2001. Id. 1 3. He promptly reconsidered his position concerning the deposition in light of this new information. On March 27, 2001, Mr. Minton's counsel initiated a telephone conference with RTC's counsel to seek RTC's agreement to postpone the deposition unless and until the Northern District granted RTC's motion for leave to execute on the judgment. Id. y[ 4. RTC's counsel refused to agree to such a postponement, id., and Mr. Minton filed the instant motion for a protective order.

RTC's protestations that Mr. Minton's motion for a protective order is untimely are insincere at best: Mr. Minton was unaware of the procedural posture of this matter and had no reason to call into question the appropriateness of Rule 69 discovery until immediately before contacting RTC's counsel seeking a postponement of the deposition. Thus, Mr. Minton could not have filed his motion for a protective order prior to his deposition on November 2, 2000 or prior to participating in discussions with RTC's counsel concerning a third deposition of Mr. Minton in this matter because he did not know ? and could not reasonably have known ? that RTC lacked authority to go forward with discovery of Mr. Minton. Although RTC had filed its motion for leave to execute the judgment against debtor Grady Ward on September 30, it

proceeded to conduct the November 2 deposition of Mr. Minton without ever informing Mr. Minton or his counsel of such motion. The fact that Mr. Minton acted in good faith by making himself available for the deposition should not now be held against him.

III. RTC'S CROSS?MOTION FOR CONTEMPT IS SIMPLY ANOTHER FORM OF HARASSMENT OF MR. MINTON AND SHOULD BE DENIED

In response to Mr. Minton's Motion for a Protective Order, RTC filed a Cross?Motion for an Order of Contempt. RTC's Consolidated Memorandum in support of its cross?motion is replete with misrepresentations and omissions, and constitutes only an attempt to harass and intimidate Mr. Minton as "punishment" for providing financial support to Ward and several other individuals who are critics of RTC and COS.

A. Mr. Minton's assistance to Scientology critics

As stated in his opening Memorandum, Mr. Minton is a private citizen who has provided financial assistance to several individuals who have sued and been sued by various affiliates of COS, including RTC. He has done so out of concern for the way in which COS treats individuals who dare criticize it. Supp. Ricci Aff., Exh. Q?A, 9[ 3. Specifically, he finds offensive COS's litigious nature and its practice of trying to crush its critics under the heavy weight of litigation. Id. 9[ 4. For these reasons, he has sometimes offered modest (relative to the funds spent by COS) amounts of money to help defray the costs of litigation. Among his goals in doing so are to produce a "fairer fight" and to make it more likely that the matters at issue are fairly heard and decided by the courts rather than disappear because one of the litigants cannot afford to continue. Id. 15. Moreover, Mr. Minton neither is a party to any of these suits nor has any involvement in or direct knowledge about the underlying matters being litigated.

B. COS's harassment of Mr. Minton and his family

COS has responded to Mr. Minton's activities predictably. Over the past several years, COS has taken aggressive steps to harass and intimidate Mr. Minton and his family. COS has dispatched private detectives to try to "dig up dirt" on Mr. Minton from his relatives and former business associates. It has had Mr. Minton's two young daughters followed on two occasions. One representative of COS has threatened to attack Mr. Minton through his family, former business associates, and tax authorities. On many occasions, COS has had its members blanket Mr. Minton's neighborhood with leaflets containing false and highly inflammatory statements about him. Suppl. Ricci Aff., Exh. Q (Affidavit of Robert S. Minton dated Dec. 7, 2000), 9[y[ 411. In February 2000, two men who identified themselves as working for the law firm of Moxon & Kobrin approached Mr. Minton's seventy?seven?year?old mother, two aunts, and two brothers at their homes in Nashville, Tennessee. Id. 9[ 8. Warning Mr. Minton's family that "someone is going to get hurt," these individuals went so far as to say that they would be willing to pay the cost for his family to have Mr. Minton committed to a mental institution and to help them set up a conservatorship to manage his money. Id. 9[ 8. Within the last few months, a "private investigator" named Mr. Hirsch, from an organization apparently known as International Inquiries, falsely warned Mr. Minton's personal accountant that the Nigerian government had filed formal criminal charges against Mr. Minton and asserted that a Swiss bank account allegedly belonging to him had been frozen. Id. y[ 11 & Exh. O. These statements were totally false. Id. COS, through the very counsel that that appears for RTC here, has threatened Mr. Minton, expressing its displeasure that Mr. Minton has "undertaken the financial maintenance of a significant number of litigants adverse to Scientology Churches in the United States":

A number of those with whom you have associated yourself through your patronage . . . have engaged in threats and acts of violence, attempts at intimidation and scandal?mongering. Association with lawbreakers such as these, combined with the monetary demands that inevitably accompany their involvement in litigation or similar fertile areas for attempts of extortion, make your actions of interest to the prosecutors to whom such conduct has been referred.

My client holds you, your associates and backers, financial or otherwise, personally responsible for any and all damages it has suffered or will continue to suffer as a result of your tortious officious intermeddling in Church litigation. The Church will not tolerate such conduct. I demand that you immediately withdraw all financial support for such matters and am warning you that you and those you're funding have crossed the threshold of legality. Suppl. Ricci Aff., Exh. Q?A, 9[ 15 & Exh. 2. Consistent with its past actions, COS brings this motion for an order of contempt only in an attempt to harass Mr. Minton and to seek information that COS might use to sue Mr. Minton.

C. The discovery that RTC seeks and to which Mr. Minton has not agreed is improper

As reflected in the correspondence between counsel, RTC and Mr. Minton arrived at an agreement on most matters concerning a third deposition of Mr. Minton, and Mr. Minton is prepared to adhere to that agreement in the event that either the Northern District or this Court rules that RTC is entitled to discovery of Mr. Minton. Some of the information sought by RTC is improper, however, and only emphasizes RTC's purpose of harassing Mr. Minton.

1. Payments to or for the benefit of Grady Ward

As reflected in a confirmatory letter to Stephen Jonas of Hale and Dorr from Helena Kobrin dated February 2, 2001, with respect to the first category of discovery sought by RTC, Mr. Minton has agreed to provide documents and information concerning payments to Ward or to third parties on Ward's behalf, to the extent that he has knowledge of such payments. Kobrin Decl., Exh. 44. In the event that a court opens the door for RTC to depose Mr. Minton, he will produce these documents and this information.

2. Corporate information concerning the Lisa McPherson Trust (LMT) With respect to a different category of discovery sought by RTC, Mr. Minton believes that "corporate information concerning LMT" falls outside the proper scope of Rule 69 discovery (even if RTC were to obtain permission to execute the judgment), and is being sought by RTC for other purposes, namely, to harass Mr. Minton and to gather information to use against Mr. Minton in another lawsuit.

As set forth in by RTC's Consolidated Memorandum, RTC seeks (a) the corporate records of LMT, (b) the financial records of LMT, (c) information as to who owns the shares of LMT, and (d) information as to whether Mr. Minton ever signs LMT's checks. RTC Consol. Mem. at 18?19. A judgment creditor may proceed pursuant to Rule 69 only "to find out about assets on which execution can issue or about assets that have been fraudulently transferred or are otherwise beyond the reach of execution." Wright, Miller & Marcus, Federal Practice & Procedure, Civil 2d �3014 (1997). The discovery sought by RTC concerning the LMT's corporate information falls far outside the scope of any legitimate discovery regarding Ward's assets, and RTC should not be permitted to take discovery in this matter for the purpose of attempting to "discover" a right of action against Mr. Minton. As noted above, RTC's discovery requests against Mr. Minton are improper for purposes of discovering a reason to sue him. See Oppenheimer Fund, 437 U.S. at 352?53; Blount Int'l, 124 F.R.D. at 527.

D. Curtailment of RTC's discovery efforts is necessary to prevent further harassment

Through their respective efforts in this case and in other actions, RTC and COS have demonstrated their willingness to use compulsory process not only to harass but also to advance their purposes in other litigation. In fact, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts has already ruled on a similar dispute between RTC and Mr. Minton wherein RTC sought Mr. Minton's deposition in the bankruptcy proceedings involving Grady Ward. Religious Technology Center v. Ward (Bankr. D. Mass. Apr. 17, 1998) (MBD No. 98?101?CJK). Following briefing and oral argument, the Bankruptcy Court issued a Memorandum of Decision on a Motion to Compel the Deposition of Robert Minton in April 1998, concluding:

At the hearing on this motion, RTC left little doubt that it wanted in this deposition to interrogate Minton on all his connections to opponents of and litigation against the Churches of Scientology and their affiliated entities, but it demonstrated no clear or direct relevance of those matters to the dischargeability proceedings against [debtor Grady] Ward. Clearly, too, the RTC would use this opportunity to seek information that the Church might use to sue Minton. In sum, the RTC's primary, though not exclusive interest in [Mr. Minton's] deposition is for use in matters and proceedings other than the nondischargeability action. Suppl. Ricci Aff., Exh. O, at 4?5.4 In the present matter, Mr. Minton has already provided answers during his depositions on September 29, 1999 and November 2, 2000. RTC is entitled to nothing further. 5 At least one other court has explicitly noted RTC's abuse of the litigation process to silence COS critics. In Religious Technology Center v. Lerma, a copyright action brought by RTC, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held:

[T]he Court finds that the motivation of [RTC] in filing this lawsuit against The [Washington] Post is reprehensible. Although RTC brought the complaint under traditional secular concepts of copyright and trade secret law, it has become clear that a much broader motivation prevailed ? the stifling of criticism and dissent of the religious practices of Scientology and the destruction of opponents. L. Ron Hubbard, the founder of Scientology, has been quoted as looking upon the law as a tool to "jh]arass and discourage rather than to win. The law can be used very easily to harass and enough harassment on somebody who is simply on the thin edge anyway, well knowing that he is not authorized, will generally be sufficient to cause his professional decease. If possible, of course, ruin him utterly."

Ultimately, the Bankruptcy Court permitted RTC to make a very limited inquiry pertaining to communications and dealings between Mr. Minton and debtor Grady Ward by deposition on written questions only. RTC never submitted written questions. Suppl. Ricci Aff., Exh. O, at 6. RTC makes much of the discovery sought from Mr. Minton in a case involving debtor H. Keith Henson. Although the Honorable Joan Feeney ordered Mr. Minton to appear for his continued deposition, the court subsequently denied RTC's request for sanctions against Mr. Minton following his further deposition. Suppl. Ricci Aff., Exh. P.

12.

908 F. Supp. 1362, 1368 (E.D. Va. 1995) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The following day, the District Court issued an amended order, specifically finding that RTC had "unclean hands" as a result of its "true motives" behind the litigation:

[T]he Court is now convinced that the primary motivation of RTC suing Lerma, DGS, and The [Washington] Post is to stifle criticism of Scientology in general and to harass its critics. As the increasingly vitriolic rhetoric of its briefs and oral argument now demonstrate, RTC appears far more concerned about criticism of Scientology than vindication of its trade secrets. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1353, 1360 (E.D. Va. 1995). The same motivation is at work here. In light of COS's pattern of out?of?court harassment of Mr. Minton, RTC's request for an order compelling Mr. Minton's continued deposition should be denied. In short, RTC's present motion is nothing more than its most recent intimidation technique conveniently "dressed up" as a court filing.

IV. RTC SHOULD BE ORDERED TO PAY MR. MINTON'S COSTS IN OPPOSING THE CROSS?MOTION FOR AN ORDER OF CONTEMPT AND TO COMPEL MR. MINTON TO PROVIDE DISCOVERY UNDER RULE 69.

By its terms, Rule 69 makes the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing discovery (Rules 26 through 37) applicable. Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a). Rule 37(b)(2) thus governs sanctions for misuse of the discovery process. It is well?established that the Court has broad discretion to manage the discovery process. Daigle v. Maine Med. Ctr., Inc., 14 F.3d 684 (1st Cir. 1994). In so doing, the Court may award sanctions for discovery abuses. Rule 37(a)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

If the motion [for an order compelling discovery] is denied, the court may enter any protective order authorized under Rule 36(c) and shall, after affording an opportunity to be heard, require the moving party or the attorney filing the motion or both of them to pay the party or the deponent who opposed the motion the reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney's fees, unless the court finds that the making of the motion was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.

(emphasis added). Both a protective order against any further discovery of Mr. Minton in any proceedings relative to debtor Grady Ward and an award of attorney's fees and other costs are particularly appropriate here. On March 27, 2001, upon learning of Judge Fogel's denial of RTC's motion for leave to execute the judgment, counsel for Mr. Minton initiated a telephone conference with RTC's counsel and requested that she agree (1) to withdraw RTC's opposition to Mr. Minton's motion for a protective order and (2) to withdraw its motion for an order of contempt. Suppl. Ricci Aff., y[ 4. RTC's counsel refused this request and refused even to seek approval of the Northern District before proceeding on an alter ego or enterprise liability theory. Suppl. Ricci Aff., Exhs. K?M. RTC's refusal is further evidence of its intent only to harass Mr. Minton.

Mr. Minton respectfully requests that the Court order RTC to pay his costs, including attorney's fees, incurred in responding to the motion for an order of contempt and to compel discovery. RTC and COS have engaged in a pattern of extra judicial harassment of Mr. Minton, and RTC's present motion is merely an extension of that effort. Mr. Minton should not have to incur the costs of responding to such clearly abusive discovery. V. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Minton respectfully requests that the Court deny RTC's motion to hold. him in contempt, enter an appropriate protective order staying further discovery

of him, and award Mr. Minton his costs. A revised proposed order accompanies this Consolidated Reply Memorandum.

Respectfully submitted, ROBERT S. MINTON By his attorneys,

s/Linda M. Ricci

Stephen A. Jonas (BBO #542005)
Linda M. Ricci (BBO #600284)
HALE AND DORR LLP
60 State Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02109 (617) 526-6000

Dated: April 11, 2001

On Sat, 14 Apr 2001 01:18:53 -0400, Bob Minton <bobminton@lisatrust.net> wrote:

> See the post entitled: RTC chasing $3.0 Million from Minton re Grady Ward
> with Message-ID: <2ujfdt4359e2tr73edp9gb1q74dsv1b8gn@4ax.com>
>
> This is a RAW uncorrected OCR of RTC's 03-16-01 motion delineating alter-ego
> and enterprise theories against me in order to try and collect the $3 million
> stipulated judgement in RTC v Ward from me. Of course in RTC v Ward, Judge
> Fogel has ruled that RTC CANNOT collect against Ward. It's bizarre.

It truly is bizarre. But I have a theory. They are running out of money and, because of the net information, can't collect anything like as much as they used to. Thus, they are trying to reg it out of people like you though the courts. Wild theory, but consider how they have stretched out construction in CW and Hemet.

Is the end at hand?

Keith Henson

This is the rule called into question in Mintons post:

From: Bob Minton <bobminton@lisatrust.net>
Subject: RTC chasing $3.0 Million from Minton re Grady Ward
Date: Sat, 14 Apr 2001 00:39:19 -0400

I am quoting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69 from http://www2.law.cornell.edu/cgi-bin/foliocgi.exe/frcp/query=[jump!3A!27rule69!27]/doc/{@721}?

"(a) In General."

"Process to enforce a judgment for the payment of money shall be a writ of execution, unless the court directs otherwise. The procedure on execution, in proceedings supplementary to and in aid of a judgment, and in proceedings on and in aid of execution shall be in accordance with the practice and procedure of the state in which the district court is held, existing at the time the remedy is sought, except that any statute of the United States governs to the extent that it is applicable. In aid of the judgment or execution, the judgment creditor or a successor in interest when that interest appears of record, may obtain discovery from any person, including the judgment debtor, in the manner provided in these rules or in the manner provided by the practice of the state in which the district court is held."

This is something used in proceedings to enforce the collection of judgements. In this situation, Mition himself is not even a "party to this action", he is just a witness, for giving Garry money. This has little to do with him. It could be said that he is a "third party". Mintons guilt or liability is not even being called into question. RTC's overuse of this authority might tend to create an illusion that Minton has anything to do with this. He's not being sued. He is just a witness. RTC is taking advantage of the powers in Rule 69 just to bother him. What an ugly attempt by RTC to manipulate the legal system to dramitize its own abberation.

This is what I understand from the information provided and my limited knowledge of law, if anyone has any contrary data, or even some kind of half-assed argument that RTC is using this rule for sincere reasons, please feel free to correct me.

I am not a licensed attorney, and nothing contained herein is legal advice, but I dont have to be a laywer to realize that RTC is just using the law to bother and harrass other people, especially when a collection proceeding is made to look like a direct civil proceeding.

LOGIC18

On Mon, 16 Apr 2001 19:36:55 -0500, Tommy <"tommy a "@ hotmail.com> wrote:

>theta1-no-spam@cotse.com wrote:

>> >On 15 Apr 2001 18:35:50 -0700, morgan@my-deja.com wrote:

>> > $5,200.00,
>> > +$3,000.00
>> >------------------
>> > $8,200.00

>> > $8,200.00 < $1,000,000.00

>> > Try again.

>> > You're a week late and $991,800.00 short.

>> > So when you said a million bucks, were you lying, or were
>> > you just mindlessly repeating what your insane cult
>> > leaders told you?

>> What were the fines for?

> What were the lies for?

The *discovery sanctions* were because Bob Minton kept his word to keep donor records confidential. In other words, he is being punished for being a man of honor, while criminals are rewarded for being criminals.

Welcome to the American legal system, where Justice is not merely blind, but ugly, and a whore, to boot.

ptsc